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Abstract: This paper addresses the function of a European basic law. The author argues 
that if the basis of the original legitimising act of a basic law is weak, or even non-
existing, a need arises for succeeding or continuous legitimising acts. The concept of 
continuous  legitimation  implies  that  the  basic  law  has  to  be  legitimised  through  the 
ongoing  political  consensus  formation  giving  the  basic  law  a  dynamic  nature. 
Furthermore, the need for continual legitimation juxtaposed with a dynamic nature of a 
basic law obstructs the idea of a disabling function of a basic law. The author concludes 
that the  dynamic  nature  of  the  European basic  law  and  its  corresponding  concept  of 
legitimacy – ever forming and reforming overlapping consensuses among the decision-
making actors in low as in high politics – can only underpin an enabling European basic 
law.  
 





The discussion as to whether the European Union (EU) has a constitution, rather than a 
treaty, as its basic law or whether it could have one, and if it could, whether it needs one, 
has been occupying political as well as legal scientists at least since the adoption of the 
Maastricht  Treaty  (TEU).  The  Treaty  has by  many  been  perceived as one of  several 
constitutional  moments  of  the  European  Community  transforming  itself  from  an 
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economical community into a political union. The constitutionalisation process
3 of the 
EC Treaties has found its temporary consolidation in a Treaty establishing a constitution 
for  the  European  Union  (Constitutional  Treaty  -  CT)  –  a  hybrid  with  features  of  a 
constitution as well as a treaty. In the wake of the French and Dutch rejection of the 
Constitutional Treaty, politicians and academics alike have been preoccupied with the 
question of its (democratic) legitimacy.   
 
The object of this paper is to deepen the on-going debate by examining the function a 
European basic law (be it the Constitutional Treaty or a “mini-treaty”) will, or rather can, 
have.
4  Is  it  a  basic  law  that  mainly  draws  up  the  competences  of  the  governmental 
institutions,  or  is  its  primary  effect  to  impose  restraints  on  the  political  institutions 
policymaking ability? More concretely, and in connection to the EU, the question to be 
discussed  in  this  paper  is  whether  the  legal  framework  of  the  EU  limits  or  enables 
Community policies, i.e. whether institutions are given competences to pursuit policies 
which in most cases would imply the further integration of the European Union, or not. 
My hypothesis is that if the basis of the original legitimising act of a basic law is weak, or 
even  non-existing,  a  need  arises  for  succeeding  or  continuous  legitimising  acts.  The 
concept  of  continuous  legitimation  implies  that  the  basic  law  has  to  be  legitimised 
through the ongoing political consensus formation, exposing it to changes reflected in 
day-to-day  political  decision-making.  The  need  for  continual  legitimation  juxtaposed 
with a dynamic nature of a basic law obstructs the idea of a disabling function of a basic 
law. The reason for this is that a restraining function presupposes that the constitution is 
of a static nature, and in addition that it is based on an original legitimising act of a higher 
order. A dynamic nature of the basic law legitimised through political processes of day-
to-day – or if we stick to Ackerman’s terminology
5 –  low politics could, on the contrary, 
support an enabling function. 
  
                                                 
3 Mancini, Federico Democracy and Constitutionalism in the EU (Oxford: Hart, 2006). 
4 On the European Council meeting in Berlin in March 2007 it was suggested to abandon the reference to a 
“constitution” in the title of the document.  
5 The concepts of high and low politics can be found in Ackerman, Bruce We the People (Cambridge: 
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In the following, I will briefly discuss the constitutionalisation process of the EU wherein 
the pending question, in my opinion, is that of legitimacy. The legitimacy question, in 
turn, at least if we are to  take the ideas of constitutionalism  seriously,  leads us  to a 
discussion  of  the  pouvoir  constituant  and  to  the  idea  of  constitutional  moments  and 
constitutional change. These considerations, finally, lead back to the question as to which 
function the Constitutional Treaty has, and could have.  
 
 
A European Basic Law 
Clearly, the treaties that provide the legal basis of the European Community are treaties 
of international law, although, it can be argued that international treaties establishing an 
international (or for that sake a regional) organisation – as opposed to traditional bilateral 
or multilateral treaties – do have some constitutional characteristics. The question has 
been raised as to whether international organisations’ law is part of international law, or 
whether it has created a new category of law between a treaty and a constitution.
6 The so-
called constitutionalisation of international treaties is what the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) had in mind when stating in Les Verts that the founding treaties of the Community 
are its “Basic Constitutional Charter”.
7  
 
One could claim that the ECJ through its jurisprudence has itself contributed significantly 
to the so-called constitutionalisation of the EC Treaties. In Van Gend & Loos
8, the Court 
stated that the Treaty provisions were to have “direct effect” vis-à-vis individuals. The 
Court concluded that the Treaties, although they did not have the qualities that we would 
attribute  to  a  traditional  constitution,  nevertheless,  had created  a  “new legal  order of 
international  law”  in  which  “independently  of  the  legislation  of  Member  States, 
community law (…) not only imposed obligations on individuals but is also intended to 
                                                 
6 For example Shaw, Malcolm N. International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997, 4th 
edition). 
7 Case 294/83 Les Verts-Parti Ecologiste v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339. 
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confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage”.
9 As opposed to the 
original rationality  of  international law, which only  imposes  rights  and  duties  on  the 
sovereign contracting states, the EC Treaties, according to the judgement, confer rights 
directly  upon  individuals,  clearly  a  feature  of  a  (national)  constitution rather  than  an 
(international) treaty. However, aspects of a vertical approach are not novel in the field of 
international  law.  What  the ECJ refers  to  as  direct effect does not  necessarily  imply 
something more than a monistic approach to international law would. And, regardless of 
the  approach  to  international  law  a  country  has  chosen  –  a  monistic  or  dualistic  – 
international customary law may nevertheless have direct effect upon individuals.
10  
 
The claimed particularity of the EC founding Treaties was restated in Costa v ENEL
11 in 
which the ECJ established the supremacy
12 of the EU law:  
 
By  creating  a  Community  of  unlimited  duration  …  the  Member  States  have 
limited their sovereign rights, albeit in limited fields, and thus created a body of 
law which binds both their nationals and themselves.
13  
 
One could, however, argue that the judges of the ECJ hardly had any choice. Without the 
judgment of Costa v ENEL, (but also that of Van Gend Loos) Community law would 
within a short period of time have been reduced to a paper tiger since there would not 
have been any obligation for the Member States to abide by it in the case of conflict with 
domestic law. The principles of supremacy and direct effect that have by many been 
celebrated  as  the  factors  that  have  contributed  most  significantly  to  the 
                                                 
9 By “constitutionalisation” in this case one clearly has in mind the dichotomy  of international law – 
constitutional law. One could, however, argue that to the degree constitutionalism concerns the limitation 
of  public  power,  the  principles  of  direct  effect  and  supremacy  has  not  contributed  to  the 
constitutionalisation of the Community, since these principles clearly reinforce Community powers rather 
than constraining them. However, constitutionalism can contain both the enablement and the constraining 
of public power, see below.  
10 On jus cogens direct applicability in Norwegian internal law see the Klinge ruling, Rt. 1946: 198. 
11 Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
12 Note the difference between primacy (Anwendungsvorrang) and supremacy (Geltungsvorrang). It has 
been  argued  by  German  scholars  that  EC  law  is  primary  and  not  supreme  to  national  law,  see  von 
Bogdandy, Armin “Constitutional Principles” in von Bogdandy, Armin and Bast, Jürgen (eds.), Principles 
of European Constitutional Law (Oxford: Hart 2006) pp. 3-52. 
13 Case Costa v ENEL note 11 above, p. 593. ConWEB No 2/2007    Tor-Inge Harbo 
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constitutionalisation of the EC Treaties are merely features that any efficient-working 
international organisation (of which, however, there are not very many today) would have 
to possess.  
 
All international cooperation will have the effect of limiting some aspects of a nation 
state’s sovereignty. However, sovereignty is not a monolithic or holistic concept but must 
rather be seen as a bundle of many sovereign rights. Therefore, what counts in assessing 
whether  a  state’s  sovereignty  has  been  limited  or  not  is  whether  the  nation  state,  in 
entering into an international arrangement, also gains some sovereign rights, i.e. whether 
one could say that its “net-sovereignty”, i.e. the sum of the rights lost and gained by 
international cooperation, increases or decreases. It is, for example, clear that countries 
would have to cooperate in order to solve the global warming problem. The cooperation 
would imply the pooling of sovereign decision-making on environmental issues to an 
international organisation, which, in turn, would make binding decisions for all countries, 
for example on the reduction of CO2 emissions. Only when all major emitting countries 
abide by the decision to reduce emissions would it be possible to avert climate change 
with potentially local catastrophic consequences, such as a rising sea-level. However, 
sovereignty  perceived  as  a  bundle  of  rights  implies  that  one  has  to  accept  a  more  
utilitarian approach to the concept, which would imply downplaying the importance of 
participation in the decision-making procedures and rather focusing on the output of the 
decision-making process being in conformity with the state’s interest. The expectation of 
an overall net increase in sovereignty – perceived one way or the other – is obviously the 
reason why a nation state would enter into an international cooperation in the first place. 
Whereas it is clear that the European Community, after the establishment of the Treaties, 
does have the competences to make law and that this law-making implies that Member 
States  and  their  respective  citizens  are  bound  by  legal  norms  without  their  express 
consent, this does not mean that the EU represented by its supranational institutions can 
make and unmake or revise the Treaties. The Member States remain the “masters of the 
Treaties” and, according to Art. 48 EC, have the competences to change them.  
 ConWEB No 2/2007    Tor-Inge Harbo 
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However,  what  some  would  perceive  as  a  legal  interpretation  others  would  view  as 
judicial activism and law-making. It could be claimed that the reading of human rights 
into the original Treaties provides an example of an original act of constitutional law, i.e. 
it  could  be  an  indication  of  the  existence  of  Kompetenz-Kompetenz  located  at  the 
supranational level of the Community. Having first rejected that Human Rights were a 
part  of  the  Treaties
14,  the  ECJ  in  Stauder  held,  albeit  in  an  obiter  dictum,  that 
”fundamental human rights [were] enshrined in the general principles of Community law 
and  protected  by  the  Court”.
15  This  approach  has  been  followed,  also  in  the  ratio 
decidendis, by the Court ever since.
16 True, this move by the ECJ was not controversial 
among the Treaty parties, but this is not the point. It is difficult to interpret the inclusion 
of human rights into the Treaties as anything other than an act of constitution-making. 
Provided that this is indeed the case, the next question would have to be: What could 
legitimate this act of constitution-making beyond the notion of tacit consent? Put in terms 
of a more general question: how are constitutions legitimised? 
 
There are alternative ways in which constitutional provisions can be constituted. One of 
them  is  through  so-called  customary  constitutional  law,  which,  in  short  could  be 
described as customary law with a constitutional content.
17 Customary constitutional law 
does  not  have  to  be  judge-made  law,  merely  a  result  of  judicial  activism,  as  this 
phenomenon has often been referred to in the case of the EU. Customary constitutional 
law has a stronger basis of authority and legitimacy since it is not only a result of judicial 
activism but rather the result of an overlapping consensus formed by a great variety of 
societal actors who actively or passively participate in the formation and consolidation of 
                                                 
14 Cases 1/58 Stork v. High Authority [1959] ECR 17; 36-38 and 40/59 Geitling v. High Authority [1960] 
ECR 423; 40/64 Sgarlata and others v. Commission [1965] ECR 215. 
15 Cases 29/69 Stauder v. City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419.  
16 Cases 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel 
[1970]  ECR  1125,  4/73  Nold  v.  Commission  [1974]  ECR 491, 44/79  Hauer  v.  Land  Rheinland-Pfalz 
[[1979] ECR 3727. 
17  A  combination  of  the  Norwegian  Basic  Law  (Grunnlov)  being  perceived  as  a  national  symbol  (in 
addition  to  being  positive  law)  and  complicated  revision  procedures  has  led  to  the  consequence  that 
customary constitutional law still forms an important part of the Norwegian constitution. ConWEB No 2/2007    Tor-Inge Harbo 
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a  practice  of  constitutional  nature.
18  In  the  case  of  the  EC/EU  this  would  imply  the 
involvement of supranational as well as intergovernmental institutions, but also other 
actors informing these institutions.  
 
As international customary  law, constitutional customary  law is dependent on  certain 
conditions being fulfilled for its generation, namely that the practice is unitary, that it has 
taken place over a certain time-span, and that it is believed to be legally binding (opinio 
juris) by those practicing it. In order for it to be of a constitutional order the custom 
would have to be of constitutional content. Catalogues of human rights form important 
part of many Western constitutions.  
 
But this is the exception that confirms the main rule, which is that modern constitutions 
are  constituted  and  revised  through  democratic  processes,  normatively  conceptualised 
through  the  pouvoir  constituant  and  institutionally  through  a  democratically  elected 
assembly – a parliament. The problem is, however, that the EU does not have a pouvoir 
constituant, at least not in a democratically demanding sense. One of the reasons for this 
situation is believed to be the lack of a European people.
19 Furthermore, it has forcefully 
been argued that the EU lacks a proper democratic institution – a parliament, which, 





Legitimising a European Basic Law  
The question of democratic legitimation of a European basic law is obviously its Achilles 
heel, at least if one holds that the constitutional language that infuses the political as well 
                                                 
18 Tully, James in Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1995) p. 59 points out that the Greek term of constitutional law, nomos, means both what 
is agreed upon by the people and what is customary, see Wiener, Antje ”Soft institutions” in ibid.; von 
Bogdandy and Bast note 12, pp. 419-449 on the application of the Greek dual concept of constitutional law 
– what she refers to as organisational and cultural practices – in case of the EU.  
19 It has been argued that the Member States constitute a “pouvoir constituant sans peuple”. 
20 See, for example, Jürgen Habermas, note 31 below. ConWEB No 2/2007    Tor-Inge Harbo 
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as academic discourse is more than about semantics.
21 In short, the argument against the 
existence of a European constitution runs as follows: since there is no European people 
(nation or Volk), there cannot be a European state; since there is no European demos – 
only the demos of the Member States – there can be no European democracy; without a 
European  state  and  a  European  democracy,  a  European  constitution  appears  plainly 
inconceivable.  According  to  this  view,  any  (quasi)constitutional  arrangement  which 
would  be  created  without  the  existence  of  a  people  would  be  an  Akt  der 
Fremdbestimmung (heteronomous European law), rather than a democratically legitimate 
Akt der Selbstbestimmung (autonomous European law).
22  
 
It is too simple to dismiss a constitution’s link to a state polity as well as to the principle 
of democracy as merely historical curiosities. There is a conceptual link between these 
phenomena  that  cannot  be  disregarded.
23  However,  the  state  polity  is,  it  has  been 
revealed, a dynamic concept, and democracy has, through history, been given different 
interpretations. Although one sticks to the theory of an intrinsic link between constitution, 
democracy  and  state,  these  three  concepts  can  themselves  be  interpreted  in  so  many 
different ways that the connection between them does not have to hinder a pragmatic 




Democratic  legitimacy,  for  example,  is  not  only  about  democratic  decision-making 
procedures in the form of elections – input. Democratic legitimacy is also about results – 
                                                 
21 Lövenstein, Karl in Möllers, Christoph “Pouvoir Constituant – Constitution – Constitutionalisation” in 
ibid. von Bogdandy and Bast, note 12 above, pp. 183-126 at 226. 
22 Grimm, Dieter “Verfassung – Verfassungsvertrag – Vertrag über eine Verfassung” in Beaud, Olivier; 
Pernice, Ingolf et al. (eds.) L’Europe en voie de Constitution. Pour un bilan critique des travaux de la 
Convention (Bruxelles: Brylant 2004) pp. 279-287 at pp. 282-3. 
23 Others would claim that constitutionalism can be seen as a mobile set of ideas, equally at home in non-
state as state settings, see for example, Shaw, Jo and Wiener, Antje “The paradox of the European Polity” 
in: Green Cowles, M. and Smith, A. (eds.) State of the European Union 5: Risk , Reform, Resistance and 
Revival (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000). 
24 On this problem see, for example, Walker, Neil ”Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation” in: 
Weiler and Wind European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2004) pp. 27-54. ConWEB No 2/2007    Tor-Inge Harbo 
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output.
25  An  international  organisation  traditionally  achieves  more  of  its  democratic 
legitimacy  through  producing  results  than  through  democratic  decision-making 
procedures. There are strong indications that this is the case for the EU as well: what the 
European  citizens  want  is,  it    first  of  all  economic  security.  The  discussion  about 
democratic  procedures  we  are  led  to  believe  is  first  of  all  of  interest  to  European 
federalists, European parliamentarians and the academic elite.  
 
It has, nevertheless, been claimed that the constitutionalisation of the EC-Treaties – in the 
sense of juridification without democratic politics – has in itself increased the legitimacy 
of  European  Law.
26  It  could  be  questioned  whether  legitimacy  deriving  from  the 
rationality  of  law,  or  for  that  sake  the  rationality  of  the  free  market  will  suffice  in 
legitimising the EU democratically. True, both the rule of law, and the rationality of the 
market economic system underpin the idea of autonomous citizens, which obviously also 
is a prerequisite for the active participation in the forming of democratic politics, at least 
if one perceives self-determination in an individual rather than a collective sense.
27 It has, 
however,  been  argued  convincingly  that  any  political  agenda  that  formulates  politics 
beyond a libertarian minimum would demand cooperation between the citizens of another 
quality  than  that  of  the  actors  in  a  market  place.  The  formulation  of  policies  of 
redistribution, for example, clearly requires a common idea about the need for such a 
policy  with  a  basis  in  a  feeling  of  solidarity  between  the  citizens.
28  After  all, 
redistributive policies would necessarily have to imply that some individuals have to give 
up part of their wealth for the benefit of their more needy brethrens. One could hardly 
claim that the EU, despite its redistributive and social policies, has exceeded politics of a 
libertarian minimum. The EU budget, which forms the financial basis of the redistributive 
policies  of  the  EU,  is  merely  around  one  per  cent  of  the  respective  Member  States’ 
                                                 
25 Scharpf, Fritz Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? ( Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999)  
26 Ibid. Möllers, Christoph in von Bogdandy, Armin and Bast, Jürgen note 21 above, pp. 220. 
27 Zulegg, Manfred “The Advantages of the European Constitution – A German Perspective” in: ibid. von 
Bogdandy, Armin and Bast, Jürgen note 12 above, pp. 803-25 at 812. 
28 Ulrich K. Preuss refers in this case to Karl Deutsch’s notion of Solidaritätsgemeinschaft as opposed to 
Transformationsgemeinschaft; see Preuss, Ulrich K. “Europa als politische Gemeinschaft” in: Schuppert, 
Gunnar Folke; Pernice, Ingolf; Haltern, Ulrich (eds.) Europawissenschaft (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2005). 
Also see the argument developed by Habermas, Jürgen (1998) Die Postnationale Konstellation: Politische 
Essays (Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp 1998). ConWEB No 2/2007    Tor-Inge Harbo 
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budgets and the redistributive policies do not even amount to half of this total budget. 
Although the social aspects of cooperation are underlined in the Constitutional Treaty 
(CT) – according to article I-2 CT justice, solidarity and non-discrimination are defining 
features of the European society, and furthermore, article I-3 (3) (2) CT commits the 
Union  to pursuing  the objective of  social  justice –  this does not necessarily  imply  a 
quantum leap towards a social Europe.   
 
Whereas  many  would  claim  that  democratic  legitimacy  would  have  to  be  found  or 
originate  in  a  sociological  fact,  typically  a  nation  or  a  people,
29  or  for  that  matter a 
European society,
30 or at least a common European public sphere,
31 clearly democratic 
legitimation  could  also  be  sought  in  a  political  process.  Political  processes  do  not 
necessarily  presuppose  the  existence  of  an  idealised  European  public  sphere.  They 
provide  merely  open  decision-making  procedures  in which  individuals and  groups of 
individuals have free access to information as well as a right to voice their opinions and 
thus  a  possibility  to  influence  the  decision-makers
32  before  the  decisions  are  taken. 
Provided open channels of information and participation decision-making would form the 
                                                 
29 See the so-called Maastricht Urteil by Bundesverfassungsgericht 1989, 155. 
30 This is asserted in Art. I-2 CT.  
31  Jürgen  Habermas’  deliberative  democratic  model,  for  example,  requires  a  common  public  sphere. 
Habermas argues himself for the existence of such a “European Public sphere” in “Remarks on Dieter 
Grimm’s: Does Europe Need a Constitution?” in European Law Journal 1995, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 303-7. 
However, most scholars would deny the existence of a European public sphere; see for example Peters, 
Bernard et.  al. “Die  Transnationalisierung  von  Öffentlichkeit  am  Beispiel  der  Europäischen  Union” in 
Leibfried, Stephan und Zürn, Michael (Eds.), Transformationen des Staates (Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp 
2006) pp. 230-61. 
32  Dehousse,  Renaud  has  suggested  something  similar  in:  ”Beyond  Representative  Democracy: 
Constitutionalism  in  a  Polycentric  Polity”  in:  Weiler,  Joseph  and  Wind,  Marlene  (eds.)  European 
Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003) pp. 135-156.  ConWEB No 2/2007    Tor-Inge Harbo 
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basis of political consensus or “overlapping consensus”
33 between a pluriverse of actors 
taking part in the decision-making process.
34  
 
For there are different ways in which law can originate in a democratic, legitimate way. 
On the one hand, we have the hierarchical law regime, which includes a constitution and 
its legitimatising basis of a unitary pouvoir constituant inspired by the universalism of the 
enlightenment. The constituting power can, however, have different sociological bases. 
Whereas the constituting power according to the theory of Emmanuel Sieyès was based 
in the political French nation, it could be held that the German constituting power was 
based in the Herderian cultural (ethnic) concept of the German Volk and, finally, the 
(historical) American in the pluralistic concept of We the people. However, none of these 
different sociological bases of the constituting power can escape the concept of the one 
ultimate  source  of  democratic  constitutional  authority  –  the  Kelsenian  Grundnorm 
combined with the Schmittian or Jacobine concept of democracy – as found within the 
nation state. This fact makes the traditional concept of the constituting power, but also the 
concept of a constitution, difficult to apply in the case of the European Union.  
 
On the other hand, there is the (social) contract which is a product of a dialectical process 
between  equals,  but  at  the  same  time  in  many  respects  (ethnical,  cultural,  linguistic) 
different  parties  which  able  them  to  unite  and  at  the  same  time  preserve  their 
particularism.  The  glue  that  binds  the  numerous  Madisonian  factions  together  is  not 
agreement  on  substantial  values,  but  rather  an  agreement  (pronounced  or  tacit)  on 
                                                 
33 This is John Rawls’ concept; see his Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press 1993). 
The overlapping consensus might ideally be referred to as a deliberative process, although it in reality 
nevertheless also could be a product of a bargaining process, see Harbo, Tor-Inge Legitimising a European 
Consitution: a Limited, Pluralistic and Efficient Democratic Model for the European Union (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos 2007) p. 85.  
34  See  for  example  Fritz  Scharpf  “Introduction:  The  Problem  Solving  Capacity  of  Multi-Level 
Governance”, JEPP 1997, p. 520 where he characterises the political process of, for example the Council as 
a contract-like cooperation between different political-administrative systems that are largely independent 
of  each  other.  This  concept  of  democracy  has  many  similarities  with  so-called  pluralist  models  of 
democracy, or what Dahl, Robert Democracy and its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press 1989) has 
called “Polyarchy”, which presupposes that popular elected democratic institutions are heavily influenced 
and sometimes even bypassed (in the case of they directing their lobbying efforts toward other institutions, 
for example the executive branch) by a strong channel of interest-group democracy; Polyarchy in the EU, 
see Harbo, Tor-Inge, ibid. ConWEB No 2/2007    Tor-Inge Harbo 
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decision-making  processes  –  an  agreement  on  the  rules  of  the  game.  Whereas  the 
American creed had its British antecedents and the citizens of the thirteen states were 
therefore  not  that  heterogeneous  after  all  at  the  time  of  the  original  constitutional 
moment, the thirteen states of the confederation were nevertheless separate political units. 
In that respect one could hold that the integration of the black population, which started 
after  the  Civil  War  and  was  first  achieved  in  the  1960s,  represented  a  far  greater 
challenge  to  the constitutional order and  thus the stability of the country.  One could 
therefore  hold  that  the  authority  of  the  American  constitution  today  rests  on  an 
overlapping  consensus  between  ever  more  diverging  groups  rather  than  a  potentially 
assimilative concept of “we the people”. In addition to allowing a greater plurality to 
exist on a permanent basis, the concept of an overlapping consensus is more dynamic 
than  the  concept  of  “we  the  people”  since  it  allows  for  permanent  re-weighting  and 
rebalancing processes in the redefining of the equilibrium of the consensus. If perceived 
as a (social) contract – an overlapping consensus – the origin of law does not have to be 
absolute  or  ultimate,  neither  normatively  nor  sociologically.  Rather  it  is  open-ended 
allowing the alteration of norms according to the product of overlapping consensuses 
formed by a plurality of actors in a body-polity; a policy-making process in which the 
federal principle of diversity complements the democratic principle of equality.  
 
If democratic legitimacy is based on an overlapping consensus, rather than deriving from 
a  sociologically  or  politically  defined  fact,  clearly  this  would  make  it  possible  to 
legitimise politics or to establish a democratic constitution in a polity in which there is 
more than one nation or people. In Switzerland, for example, four different nations are 
said to make up the societal basis of the Swiss polity. It has, thus, been argued that 
democratic decisions can also be legitimate in states of multiple demoi.
35 The point to 
make here is that a concept of overlapping consensus provides the theoretical explanation 
for the possibility of establishing a democratic pouvoir constituant where there is no one 
nation or people, but rather many nationalities or many peoples. Conceptualised this way, 
                                                 
35 Abromeit, Heidrun Democracy in Europe: Legitimising Politics in a Non-State Polity (Oxford: Berghahn 
Books 1998) p. 49. ConWEB No 2/2007    Tor-Inge Harbo 
  13
it can be argued in favour of the existence of a democratic constituting power for the 




A Constitutional Moment or Constitutional Moments? 
If  we  perceive  the  politically  dynamic  concept  of  an  overlapping  consensus  as  the 
legitimate basis of a European basic law, clearly this will also have consequences for the 
nature  of  a  European  constitution.  Sieyès’s  theory  on  the  pouvoir  constituant  was 
conspired in and for a revolutionary epoch in order to justify the rise of the bourgeoisie to 
counter and overthrow the power of the absolute monarchy. Thus, the pouvoir constituant 
was to act within a limited time-frame establishing a constitution to secure the (through 
revolution  seized)  powers  of  the  new  ruling  class.  However,  in  his  own  country  the 
concept  of  a  punctual  constitutional  moment  combined  with  a  historical  pouvoir 
constituant  was  soon  left  and  replaced  by  a  notion  of  continual  revolutions,  the 
permanent presence of the pouvoir constituant, and an endless number of constitutions.  
 
In order to conceptually explain a somewhat more cautious approach to constitutional 
amendments and change the idea of one historical constitutional moment combined with 
the pouvoir constituant acting within a limited time-frame can be supplied with a concept 
of a latent pouvoir constituant. The latent pouvoir constituant does not cease to exist after 
having constituted the original constitution. But at the same time it does not interfere in 
times of normal politics either. The latent pouvoir constituant withdraws from the day-to-
day politics and law-making and erupts only in times of, so-called, high politics. The 
concept  of  a  permanent  pouvoir  constituant  as  well  as  a  latent  pouvoir  constituant 
provides  us  with  an  alternative  evolutionary,  rather  than  revolutionary,  theory  of 
constitutionalism, i.e. constitutionalisation as a series of events rather than one event.  
 
                                                 
36  Whereas  an  overlapping  consensus  could  legitimise  a  European  democracy,  the  concept  of  a 
constitutional culture, see Snyder, Francis “The unfinished constitution of the European Union: principles, 
processes and culture” in: ibid. Weiler, Joseph and Wind, Marlene pp. 55-73, can, in my opinion, not, since 
it does not necessarily involve shared norms based on, for example, common principles of justice. ConWEB No 2/2007    Tor-Inge Harbo 
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The concept of an evolutionary constitutionalisation process could be particularly suitable 
to describe the establishment of a European basic law. Thus, the European basic law is, as 
has  been  indicated  above,  not  established  through  one  historical  act  or  by  a pouvoir 
constituant with basis in a people or peoples. Its establishment is, on the contrary, marked 
by an evolutionary step-by-step process – what Jean Monnet termed piecemeal steps – in 
which a number of actors, i.e. peoples, institutions and interest groups are involved; a 
process of creeping constitutionalisation in contrast with constitutional engineering.
37 The 
process  of  European  constitution-making  is  a  process  in  which  facts  and  norms  are 
dialectically  and  interdependently  bound  together  in  an  evolutionary  process.
38    An 
evolutionary concept of a constitution would imply the fusion of constitution-making and 
constitution changing which would also imply the dethronement (or demystification) of 
the concept of pouvoir constituant. The basic law of the EU can, therefore, be referred to 
as a “change constitution” (Wandelsverfassung)
39; a dynamic legal document open for 
revisions, and, thus, adaptable to the conjunctures of politics – of the rule of men over 
law.
40 In the EU, this process has in the later years been reflected in frequent Treaty 
revisions  during  the  1990s,  which  temporarily  has  culminated  in  the  Constitutional 
Treaty.  
 
Since  there  is  no  one  constitutional  moment,  but  rather  constitutional  moments,  this 
would also be reflected in the timeframe in which the pouvoir constituant is operative. 
The  idea  of  an  ex-post  legitimation  of  a  constitution  has  been  widely  discussed  in 
academic circles, in particular in Germany. This point of view has been reflective of the 
fact that the German Grundgesetz was legitimated ex-post. The German Grundgesetz had, 
according to the head of the constitutional commission Konrad Adenauer, been imposed 
                                                 
37 Peters, Anna Elemente einer Theorie der Verfassung Europas (Berlin: Dunckert & Humblot 2001) p. 
375. 
38 In the words of Vlad Constantinesco: “Le ‘droit constitutionnel européen’ est un mouvement, une 
tendance, une émergence, une dynamique, un devenir plus qu’un être, un processus en marche plus qu’un 
acquis définitif ”, Constantinesco, Vlad  “L’émergence d’un droit constitutionnel européen ” in : Revue 
universelle des droits de l’homme 1995, 7, p. 445 ff., at p. 447. 
39 Ipsen, Hans Petter “Die Verfassungsrolle des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für die Integration”, in: 
Schwarze, Jürgen (ed.) Der Europäische Gerichtshof als Verfassungsgericht und Rechtsschutzinstans  
(Baden-Baden: Nomos 1982) p. 29 ff. 
40 Ibid. Walker, Neil suggests that the “translation process”, i.e. the establishment of constitutional features 
on the EU-level, is a dynamic and reflexive process.  ConWEB No 2/2007    Tor-Inge Harbo 
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upon the Germans by the allied forces.
41 However, while some scholars would argue that 
the Grundgesetz was finally legitimised with the reunification process (or the revolution) 
of 1989, others would claim that the German people missed the constitutional moment 
that the reunification implied to adopt an original and popular legitimate constitution.
42 
The fact that Article 146
43 of the Grundgesetz was not taken out in the 1993 revision, 
including the fact that the document did not change its name from Grundgesetz (Basic 
Law) to Verfassung (Constitution) could indicate that the legitimation question is still 
pending.  
 
At any case, some German scholars have, with reference to the German experience, been 
eager  to  play  down  the  perceived  problem  of  an ex  ante  legitimation  of  a  European 
constitution. Jürgen Habermas has argued that, since there are no European people, but 
European peoples, a European people would first have to develop in order to legitimately 
constitute a European constitution. And for a European people to be created, one needs a 
European identity, which again is dependent on  a  European public sphere.
44  In other 
words,  Habermas  reverses  the  traditional  order  of  factors  when  he  suggests  that  a 
European (quasi) constitution could be established first, and, in turn, create the right 
environment for a European public sphere, which again could foster a European identity 
upon which a European people or demos, or pouvoir constituant could be based in order 
to legitimise the constitution ex-post.   
 
However, an ex-post legitimation of a dynamic concept of a European basic law will not 
suffice since an overlapping consensus requires simultaneous legitimacy. The decision-
making procedures incorporated in the basic law and changes in these must at all time be 
accepted by the decision-making actors in order to give them effect. A dynamic concept 
                                                 
41 “Wir [the parliamentary council that was assigned to draft the Grundgesetz] sind keine Mandanten des 
deutschen Volkes, wir haben den Auftrag von den Alliierten”, Steingart, Gabor Deutschland: Der Abstieg 
eines Superstars (Muenchen: Piper 2004) p. 154. 
42 Preuss, Ulrich K. Revolution, Forschritt und Verfassung (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag 
1994)  
43 Art. 146 Grundgesetz: “Dieses Grundgesetz, das nach Vollendung der Einheit und Freiheit Deutschlands 
für das gesamte deutsche Volk gilt, verliert seine Gültigkeit an dem Tage, an dem eine Verfassung in Kraft 
tritt, die von dem deutschen Volke in freier Entscheidung beschlossen worden ist.”  
44 Ibid. Habermas, Jürgen (1995), note 31 above.  ConWEB No 2/2007    Tor-Inge Harbo 
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of an overlapping consensus embedded in the political processes would be the only way 
in which one could be sure that the decision-making actors would abide by ever changing 
decision-making procedures. The dynamic nature of the European basic law juxtaposed 
with  the  way  in  which  its  legitimation  is  conceptualised  bears,  in  turn,  upon  its 
functionality, as we shall see below. 
 
 
The Function of a Basic Law 
In a constitution, law and politics meet
45 and the relationship between the two is defined. 
This is also the case for the European basic law. Whereas a European Constitutional 
Treaty has by some been called upon in an attempt to redefine the relationship between 
law and politics in favour of the latter, others would use the opportunity that the drafting 
of a constitution gives to put clear constraints on a more politicised Union. It is, in this 
context, worth exploring two historical archetypes of “constitutions” hoping that they 
could provide us with a conceptual point of departure when examining the function of the 
European basic law as reflected in the Constitutional Treaty. 
 
The French revolution implied a change of regime; the replacement of the sovereign 
absolutist monarch with the sovereignty of the people. In order to counter the reactionary 
monarchy-loyal  forces  of  the  ancient  regime,  which  constituted  a  threat  to  the 
achievements of the revolution, absolute loyalty was demanded to the new regime. As 
long as the Jacobin terror was executed in the name of the revolution, in accordance with 
the general will, liberty of the individual, it was believed, was not interfered with. The 
revolutionary  concept  of  liberty  was  interpreted  as  liberty  from  other  individuals 
(feudalist dependence) and not as liberty from the state as the institutionalisation of the 
general will. A limitation of the state was in accordance with Locke’s contractual theory 
perceived as an absurdity. Thus, Rousseau argued:  
 
                                                 
45 Preuss, Ulrich K.  “Der Begriff der Verfassung und ihre Beziehung zur Politik” in: Preuss, Ulrich K. (ed.) 
Zum Begriff der Verfassung: Die Ordnung des Politischen (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag 
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Each citizen shall be at the same time perfectly independent of all his fellow 
citizens and excessively dependent on the republic (…) it is the power of the state 
alone which makes the freedom of its members.
46  
 
For Rousseau, the way to liberty is the path of voluntary submission to the state as the 
interpreter of the “general will”. The purpose of the revolution was first of all the over-
throw of the ancient regime and once this was achieved it had to be defended with all 
means. This included the use of terror, as noted above, but also the use of the constitution 
in order to bind the achievements of the social progressive revolution, i.e. a political 
benchmarking in a constitutional form. This gave the first constitution a retrospective, 
rather  than  a  prospective  character:  it  displayed  the  political  achievements  already 
reached consolidating and facilitating the political power of the regime in charge. If the 
political  realities  changed,  this  would  mean  that  the  constitution  would  have  to  be 
changed as well. The constitution, as perceived this way, is an instrument to enable, 
rather than to restrict political power. Hence, as the political regimes of France have 
changed rather frequently after the revolution of 1789, so have its constitutions.  
 
The American Constitution was, on the contrary, to be greatly inspired by the Lockean 
concept of the social contract. Whereas the French Constitution has been described as 
“statist, meaning that it formed the basis of the establishment of the state – the political, 
the  American  Constitution  has  been  categorised  as  societal.
47  For,  the  American 
Constitution implied at the same time the founding of American society. Whereas the 
subject - the pouvoir constituant - of the French Constitution – la nation - existed prior to 
the constitutional act, the pouvoir constituant of the American Constitution – “We the 
People” – was constituted together with the Constitution. Whereas the French nation is an 
independent factor detached from its Constitution(s), the American people is not. Hence, 
any  alteration  of  the  American  Constitution  would  imply  a  redefinition,  not  only  of 
American society, but of the constituting power – the people – itself.  
                                                 
46 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques Social Contract (London : Penguin Books 1762/1968) p. 99. 
47 Ibid. Preuss, Ulrich K. 1994 p. 25; Preuss, Ulrich K.  “The political meaning of constitutionalism” in: 
Bellamy, Richard (ed.) Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European 
Perspectives (Aveburg: Aldershot 1996) pp. 11-27 at p. 20. 
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Being  a  result  of  a  horizontal  social  contract  which  creates  mutually  binding  legal 
obligations between the citizens; a contract which becomes binding upon the constituent 
power  itself,  the  American  Constitution  not  only  degraded  the  importance  of  the 
representative assembly as pouvoir constitué, but also the people as pouvoir constituant. 
According to American constitutional theory, the Constitution itself is sovereign. This 
explains the almost sacred position of the American Constitution – the “political bible” of 
the land
48, the political religion of the nation;
49 its long life (oldest Constitution in the 
world) and, thus, the unwillingness to revise it: by revising the Constitution one could 
risk  jeopardising  the  very  foundation  of  the  society.  The  American  Constitution  has 
therefore never been revised, merely amended 26 times – whereas the French have had 
almost as many Constitutions. Sovereignty of the constitution means sovereignty of the 
people  acting  within  the  framework  of  its  constitution.  Constitution  and  people  are 
inseparable:  the  people  constitute  the  constitution;  the  people  are  bound  by  its 
constitution.  
 
While  Rousseau  sought  to  protect  the  people  against  a  disabling  constitution, 
conceptualising a constitution as a political instrument, rather than a legal strait-jacket, 
the  Founding  Fathers  of  the  Lockean  inspired  American  Constitution  proposed  to 
construct a constitutional shield against the people’s own potential propensity for myopia, 
injustice, irresponsibility, irrationality, and stupidity. A constitution could be perceived as 
an institutionalised cure for this chronic myopia: it disempowered temporary democratic 
majorities  in  the  name  of  binding  norms.  “We  the  People”,  the  Founding  Fathers 
suggested,  need  a  constitution  to  protect  us/them  from  us/themselves;  the  American 
Constitution  also  had  to  be  protected  from  the  revolutionary  drive  of  the  pouvoir 
constituant just as Ulysses needed to bind himself to the mast in order to hinder himself 
from being lured to shipwreck by the Sirens.
50  
 
                                                 
48 Paine, Thomas Rights of Man in Political Writings, ed. by Philip, Mark (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
1791/1995). 
49 Lincoln, Abraham Selected Speeches and Writings, ed. by Vidal, G. (New York 1992). 
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Hence, the American people does not embody a homogeneous, revolutionary, political, 
irrational  volonté  générale  but  rather  a  pluralist,  tolerant,  through  law  civilised  and 
rationalised common sense. According to Preuss: 
 
Der politische Character des durch Einigung geschaffenen Gemeinwesens liegt 
nicht in der verfassten Einheit und der in sie investierten Macht der Gemeinschaft, 
sondern  in  der  durch  Rechte,  Verfahren  und  Institutionen  gestützten  und 
geförderten Fähigkeit der Individuen zur Assoziation, zur Verträglickeit und auch 
zur Kooperation im Dissens.
51  
 
“We the people” indicates that the constituting subject is pluralistic and not a Schmittian: 
“homogenes  Sein  des  Volkes”
52  or  a  Bodinean:  “une,  indivisible,  inaliénable  et 
imprescriptible” sovereign nation, as expressed in the French Constitution of 1791.
53 The 
American Revolution and Constitution were not  about informing the political general 
will, but, the contrary: about restraining the “tyranny of the majority”. The point was to 
secure the freedom and plurality of the individuals of American society, not to force them 
into a uniform collective. The Constitution does not legitimise or create a political unified 
power, rather it creates a common playing field; a framework for societal coexistence and 
cooperation  under  the  sovereignty  of  the  Constitution.  The  American  promise  –  the 
American dream – was the individual’s freedom to pursue his own decent way of life in 
voluntary cooperation with others with as little interference from government as possible. 
This was, after all, the reason why its immigrants fled repressive regimes in Europe in the 
first  place.  For  the  French,  as  well  as  other  Europeans  influenced  by  the  feudalist 
mentality  and  collectivist  spirits,  welfare  and  social  security  toppled,  then  (as  now), 
freedom, in the meaning of individualism
54 and entrepreneurial spirit.  
 
If  we  then  turn  to  the  EU,  we  clearly  have  some  problems  applying  either  of  these 
historical or conceptual models, at least to their full extent. As noted above, the EU basic 
                                                 
51 Ibid. Preuss, Ulrich K.  “Der Begriff der Verfassung... ” (1994), note 45 above, p. 17. 
52 Ibid. Preuss, Ulrich K. Revolution, Forschritt und Verfassung (1994), note 42 above, pp. 63-4. 
53 Title III, Art. 1. 
54 Even in a Tocquevillean sense – self-interest rightly understood, see Tocqueville, Alexis de Democracy 
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law is a “Wandelsverfassung”, which is clearly more in line with the French than the 
American constitutional history. The frequent changes of the European basic law(s), a 
process which accelerated in the 1990s, imply that it has a dynamic, rather than a rigid or 
static nature. This nature implies that there is not one “constitutional moment”, but rather 
many “constitutional moments” reflected in the constitutionalisation process of the EC 
Treaties.  
 
Yet, it appears that the preferred source of legitimation for a European basic law; the 
search for a European “we the people” is more in line with the (original) American than 
the French. However, whereas the purpose of a Rawlsian “overlapping consensus”
55 is to 
form a value basis through which the consensuses of normal politics can be legitimised, 
the concept of an “overlapping consensus” suggested in the European context also applies 
to  the  legitimation  of  the  low  politics.  In  the  case  of  the  EU  there  is  no  difference 
between high politics and normal politics in this regard. The reason for this is the fragile 
societal  basis  of  the  EU:  overlapping  consensuses  have  to  be  formed  and  reformed 
continuously in order to legitimise high as well as low policies. The dynamic nature of 
the constitution – the fusion between constitution-making and changing – adds value to 
this argument.  
 
The nature of the constitution and the way in which it is legitimised has implications for 
its functionality. The fact that the basic legal document of the EU is of a dynamic and 
political, rather than a rigid and legal nature – it is, as noted above, a Wandelsverfassung 
–  implies  that  it  cannot  have  a  restraining  function  on  politics  since  a  restraining 
constitution requires not only that the constitution is the “supreme law of the land”, i.e. 
that it has the status of supreme positive law within a Kelsenian legal hierarchy. It also 
requires,  and  this  is  closely  connected  to  the  first  notion,  a  differentiation  between 
constitution making and constitution changing. In the EU, this is not the case.  
 
Furthermore, the dynamic nature of the EU basic legal document and its corresponding 
concept of legitimacy – ever forming and reforming overlapping consensuses among the 
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decision-making actors in low as in high politics – can only underpin an enabling basic 
legal document. The reason for this is that a restraining constitution would imply that its 
legitimising act is of a higher order than that of normal politics. A legitimising act of a 
higher order could, for example, mean that the procedures are more demanding; that more 
actors are involved; that a higher degree of consensus is required, and so on. An enabling, 
political basic law of the EU is, as we shall see below, also an empirical fact.  
 
Although the ECJ has claimed in the case Costa v. ENEL that “the Member States have 
limited their sovereign rights,” most Member States, when signing the EC Treaties, were 
clearly of the opinion that this transfer of power was to take place only “within limited 
fields”. However, it could be argued that the adoption of the Single European Act and the 
subsequent harmonisation project introduced in order to create a Single European Market 
(SEM) has led to the concession of sovereignty in “ever wider fields”
56. The introduction 
of the subsidiarity principle in the Maastricht Treaty must be seen as an attempt to slow 
down the creeping expansion of Brussels’ powers in the aftermath of the latest integrative 
developments resulting from the establishment of the SEM in 1992. One could very well 
see parallels between the principle of subsidiarity and the Lockean social contract, in 
which  the  prerequisite  for  the  individual  consensus  to  being  ruled  by  a  Hobbesian 
Leviathan was the guarantee of individual rights. Only by ensuring the Member States 
that  Brussels  would  intervene  conditioned  to  its  capacity  to  solve  the  task  more 
effectively  than  the  Member  States  themselves,  would  they  loyally  support  further 
integration.  
 
The Madisonian pluralists, on the other hand, would claim that the real challenge is not to 
protect the Member States from an alleged Leviathan disguised as the EU Commission, 
but  rather  to protect  them  from other  Member States’  pursuing  their self-interest,
57 a 
phenomenon Madison referred to as factionalism. In this view, as opposed to the former, 
there  is a  need  for  strong  and  not  weak  government  in  order  to  curb  powers  of  the 
stronger  factions  (read:  larger  Member  States)  and,  thus,  secure  the  constitutionally 
                                                 
56 ECJ Opinion 1/91. 
57 The principle of subsidiarity is supposed to provide a safe-guard here, see also Art. 6 III TEU (Treaty on 
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entrenched (sovereign) rights of the minorities (read: smaller Member States). This need 
can be illustrated by the following two examples: 
 
Having first attempted to dictate the EU position on Iraq at the 40th anniversary of the 
Franco-German Elysée-Treaty (Autumn 2002), instead of using the forum designed to 
discuss common EU foreign and defence policy laid down in the EU Treaties, the “letter 
of the eight” followed by “the letter of the ten” from EU-member and accession states 
supporting  the  American  position,  cannot  have  come  as  a  surprise  for  French  and 
Germans. The French Gaullist President Chirac’s subsequent comment about the Central 
and  Eastern  Europeans’  “bad  behaviour”  illustrates  a  lack  of  understanding  and 
consideration  for  the  unique  diversity  of  opinions  and  values  in  an  enlarged  EU.
58 
Secondly, the French and the Germans’ refusal to follow the provisions of the Growth 
and Stability Pact imposed limits on Member States’ budget deficit (although Germany 
was one of the countries insisting on the Pacts’ rigidity) is another example of how larger 
countries tend to dominate EU policies. This sends a clear signal to the other law-abiding 
(smaller) countries that there is a need for strong supranational institutions to enforce the 
politics of the Treaties. An attempt to enforce the rules seems, however, this far to be in 
vain. Although the ECJ ruled that the Commission and not the Council had the last word 
in the interpretation of the Pact,
59 the Commission was urged by the Council to formulate 
new  more  flexible  criteria,  which  in  effect  meant  giving  in  to  France  and  Germany, 
criteria which have now been adopted by the Council.
60  
 
The problem with these approaches is that the Franco-German axis, rather than being 
viewed  as  the  benevolent  motor  of  integration  (Tocquevillean  pluralists),  risks  being 
perceived as partisan, each seeking its own national interest (Madisonian factionalists). 
One could get the impression that some countries are “more equal than others” and that 
might override rights; developments which could create antagonism, rather than solidarity 
                                                 
58 This refers to the process leading up to the second Iraq war starting in March 2003; see, for example, The 
Economist Charlemagne: “Who speaks for Europe?” 6 February 2003. 
59 Case 27/04 Commission v. Council. 
60 Wernicke, Christian and Hagelüken, Alexander “Reform des Stabilitätspakts: 3 Prozent = 3,25 Prozent = 
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between the peoples of Europe. On the other hand, who would blame the French and 
Germans for pursuing their national interests in an increasingly heterogeneous Europe, in 
which it appears that everybody else is doing the same in a time in which it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to perceive the European integration as a positive sum game?
61 If 
this is going to be the future “name of the game”, a restraining constitution for Europe, 
one could assume, would be preferable, since it would contribute to the consolidation of 
achieved policies (the SEM) and slow down further integration by giving the Member 
States veto regarding any further integral steps.  
 
However, a halt in the integration process, which in turn could lead to the disintegration 
of the EU, would definitely not be in the interests of the smaller Member States. In fact, 
small countries have never had so much nominal and real power in Europe as they now 
have  within  the  institutional  frames  of  the  EU.
62  A  resumption  of  pre-war  national 
European policies of diplomatic secrecy and shifting alliances between the big countries 
would side-track the smaller states completely.  
 
And  we  have  to  admit  that  the  EU  is  to  a  great  degree  reliant  on  some  countries’ 
leadership in order to point out the direction for continued peaceful cooperation between 
the European nation states. In a Tocquevillean pluralist perspective, the French-German 
axis should, therefore be welcomed rather than feared by the other countries as important 
contributors to the European integration process. Their relentless efforts to strengthen the 
European cooperation infuse Europe with important inputs and dynamism. This does not 
mean that all their propositions should be accepted all the time. They would be wise not 
to expect that either in order to avoid antagonism (the impression of soft imperialism) 
among  the  other  states.  And,  even  more  importantly,  if  one  does  not  see  European 
                                                 
61 Whereas the Germans were happy to carry the major part of the burden of, for example, the redistributive 
policies of the 1960s (Common Agricultural Policy) and the 1990s (structural funds), since they were the 
main  benefactors  of  a  liberalisation  of  the  European  market,  they  are  more  reluctant  to  continue  this 
practice vis-à-vis the CEECs, since these countries’ high skilled low cost workforce is partly being blamed 
for the export of German investment capital and production facilities and ditto souring unemployment 
numbers in Germany. Subsidising their low tax levels through structural funds would make the Central and 
East European Countries even more competitive.                                     
62  The  weight  of  Germany  in  the  Council  of  Ministers, for  example,  is  only  seven  times that  of  tiny 
Luxembourg although the population is 320 times as large. Furthermore, the rotating presidency gives 
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integration as a goal in itself, but rather as a means to pursue other goals (e.g. freedom, 
peace and prosperity), it is not certain that more integration in all policy areas all of the 
time is always the right answer.
63 The important point is that policies are put on the 




Besides  the  consolidation  of  the  Treaties,  and  the  incorporation  of  the  Charter  of 
Fundamental Rights, the main tasks for the Convention was, according to the Laeken 
Declaration, to suggest a clearer division of competences between the Member States and 
the  EU  as  well  as  the  inclusion  of  the  national  parliaments  in  the  institutional 
architecture.
65 These are typically measures adopted to check EU politics, i.e. disable 
European politics – feature of a restraining constitution. And although majority voting 
has been extended to new areas, it is not applicable on, for example, foreign and security 
policies, or fiscal policy, i.e. the Member States have veto rights in these areas. On the 
other  hand,  the  decision-making  concept  of  double  majority  (Article  I-25  CT),  the 
reduction of the members of the Commission by 2014 (Article I-26, § 6 CT), as well as 
the introduction of a (more) permanent presidency of the European Council (Article  I-22 
CT) are all features that will contribute to the strengthening of the larger Member States 
at the expense of the smaller ones. These are at the same time features that will make the 
EU more efficient, which tend to be contrary to the function of a restraining constitution, 
although  it  does  not  necessarily  have  to  be  this  way.  The  point  of  a  restraining 
constitution is not to make the process of government easier, rather the opposite: to make 
sure  that  governance  is  conducted  under  clear  rules  and  constraints,  in  the  form  of 
individual or minority rights, making it difficult to decide contrary to their interests. In an 
                                                 
63 Dahrendorf, Ralf “Vereint oder offen? Die europäische Alternative: Gibt es nicht grössere Werte als die 
Einheit Europas? Plädoyer für den Vorrang der Freiheit vor der falschen Utopie einer politischen Union”, 
in Süddeutsche Zeitung, 15. Juli 2005 p. 14. 
64 Just see what happened to the British original rejection of the Social Chapter in the early 1990s and the 
Spanish original rejection of the draft Constitutional Treaty in December 2003. 
65 In the Laeken Declaration http://europa.eu.int/constitution/futurum/documents/offtext/doc151201_en.htm 
the Member States sought to provide a way in which they could solve the so-called Nice leftovers, i.e. the 
issues  that  they  had  not  been  able  to  solve  at  the  Nice  Intergovernmental  Conference  in  2000.  The 
Declaration provided the starting point for the Constitutional Convention, headed by the former French 
President Giscard d’Estaing, which would culminate in the Constitutional Treaty.  ConWEB No 2/2007    Tor-Inge Harbo 
  25
EU context, these minority rights could be conceptualised as sovereign rights protected 
by the principle of subsidiarity.  
 
However, there are other indications that protecting Member States’ sovereign rights after 
all is not the prime aim of the Constitutional Treaty. The foreign and security policy, for 
example,  is  included  in  the  Constitutional  Treaty  and  can  be  activated:  “when  the 
European Council, acting unanimously, so decides” (Art. 1-41, § 2 CT). This means that 
there does not have to be another European Intergovernmental Conference, or for that 
matter, another Constitutional Convention, in order to breathe life into a common policy 
on these areas. Furthermore, the Luxembourg Accord
66 – giving every Member State the 
right to veto policies when conflicting with strong national interests – is not laid down in 
the Constitutional Treaty, implying clearly the weakening of the rights of the Member 
States.  Protection for  subsidiarity  is  at best weak:  national parliaments are  invited  to 
speak up, if they think subsidiarity has been flouted, but the European Commission is 
merely obliged to take note (Art. I-11, § 3 CT). And, finally, lurking in the background is 
the flexible clause of Art. 1-18 CT, a reinvention of the notorious Art. 308 (235 EC), 
giving Brussels a quasi carte blanche for the development of new policies although this 
time with the blessing of the European Parliament.  
 
The dynamic nature of the Constitutional Treaty is not least facilitated by the goals stated 
in its preamble: “united ever more closely” and “forge a common destiny”, although the 
fact that the goals are stated in the preamble rather than included in the legally binding 
text itself, as they are in the existing Treaty, might imply a weakening of its integrative 
effect.  Anyhow,  in  the  history  of  the  European  Community,  goal-oriented  principles 
promoting  European  integration  have  always  played  an  important  role  in  the 
interpretation of its basic law. These principles permit a progressive interpretation of its 
provisions based on the object and purpose – for example, the establishment of a single 
European market – and thus provide for the dynamic nature of the European legal order. 
Most importantly, framing the Union’s goals as principles ultimately prohibits substantial 
                                                 
66 French initiated agreement from 1966 putting an end to its six months “empty chair” policy. ConWEB No 2/2007    Tor-Inge Harbo 
  26
re-nationalisation, which would materially endanger those goals.
67 The goals’ integrative 
consequences undermine therefore the most effective restraint on EU-policy formulated 
through the federal principle of subsidiarity. And furthermore, the assumption that the 
Union is more dependent on out-put legitimacy than is a state also speaks against its basic 
law as having a restraining function. The Union is, in order to secure its legitimacy, still 
largely  dependent  on  producing  certain  results,  which  in  many  cases  could  have 
integrative consequences meaning “more Europe” and “less Member States”. Even the 
constraints posted by judicial review could be perceived as enabling politics since the 
existence of judicial review mechanisms is perceived as necessary in order to legitimise 
politics  in  any  liberal democratic political regime.  Judicial review  is, in  the end, not 
perceived as limits on politics, but rather as the legitimation of politics. The ECJ, one 




Regarding the legitimacy of a European basic law, there is also a conceptual reasoning 
underpinning the more empirical observations offered above. The fact that the basic law 
of the EU is of a dynamic and political, rather than a rigid and legal nature – it is, as 
noted above, a Wandelsverfassung – implies that it cannot have a restraining function on 
politics. A restraining basic law requires not only that it is the “supreme law of the land”, 
i.e. that it has the status of supreme positive law within a Kelsenian law hierarchy. It also 
requires,  and  this  is  closely  connected  to  the  first  notion,  a  differentiation  between 
constitution making and constitution changing. In the EU, I argued above, this is not the 
case.  
 
Furthermore, the dynamic nature of the EU basic law and its corresponding concept of 
legitimacy – ever forming and reforming overlapping consensuses among the decision-
making actors in low as in high politics – can only underpin an enabling basic law. The 
reason for this is that a restraining constitution would imply that its legitimising act is of a 
                                                 
67 Ibid. von Bogdandy, Armin note 12 above, pp. 3-52 at pp. 37-8. Bogdandy refers to this as a “principle of 
integration” in European law, although he reserves himself against the principles’ potential homogenising 
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higher order than that of normal politics. In the case of the EU, the Convention (which 
drafted the Constitutional Treaty) constituted such a higher order of legitimacy vis-à-vis 
the Council decisions of normal politics. The Constitutional Treaty would, according to 
the hypothesis of this paper, have this higher order of legitimacy and thus the potential of 
legitimising a restraining constitution if the Convention had the decisive power on the 
fate of the Constitutional Treaty. However, it did not.
68  
 
The dynamic nature of the European basic law and the connected concept of legitimacy 
defended  in  this  paper  do  not  necessarily  have  to  mean  more  integration  and  the 
unavoidable  forming  of  a  European  federal  state.  The  political  institutions  could,  for 
example, decide upon the repatriation of competences to the member states. However, the 
cooperation tends to have an inner integrative dynamic, which is probably a reason why 
no competences were suggested repatriated by the Laeken Convention, although this was 
foreseen in the Laeken Declaration. An enabling basic law would be supportive of a 
politicisation, as opposed to a de-politicisation, of the Union, of which further and deeper 
integration is often, although not always, a bi-product.  
                                                 
68 The Constitutional Treaty had to be decided upon by the Council in order to be binding.  